the shithot army

political obligation, why we owe nothing to our leaders.

Question: ‘Citizens only have obligations towards their state if that state is broadly just. States that exhibit large economic inequalities between citizens are not broadly just. So citizens can have no obligations to such states.’ Is this a sound argument?

The assumption that any nations’ citizens are somehow morally obliged to honor and respect their leaders and government institutions is an erroneous one which we shall come to see is flawed because its most basic assumption, that we live in a state of equality, where our intellect/ability and resources are shared and redistributed according to those in the most direst need, is in fact false. The simple precepts of those free market egalitarians who exist in government today are of the opinion that we should demand that resources are distributed not just according to free market forces – so that every citizen can have a stake in society, but that there is also an element of necessity in the free market to give more of our precious resources to those in the most need; and finally, that there are structures and institutions in society that will enfranchise those who are unable to gather what they need from the economy to survive by providing a desert base, from which they can gather all they need until such time as they too can contribute their skills to the upkeep of their communities.

And so, to tear down the truth of the matter when it comes to the simple inference between the first and the second premise, that – ‘A. Citizens only have obligations towards their state if that state is broadly just. B. States that exhibit large economic inequalities between citizens are not broadly just,’ is false because A. all of us who are subjected to the rule of authority by the state – whether it be just or not – are still obliged to remain within its laws, traditions and institutions while they inhabit that particular society – unless they have the freedom to leave. And what is more, B. those of us who are successful in business or our careers and expect to be rewarded handsomely for their contribution to the economic and social mores of our society can immediately consider themselves to have left the egalitarian thesis of the first premise behind and entered into a libertarian contract with those in authority that would allow them to have greater access to rights, privileges and privations that would do away with the validity of the inference. It is only a veil of ignorance that allows the sophistry of equality to continue to be heralded as the answer to the often vicious competition between groups in society to hoard the majority of the precious resources to themselves and their interests, to the exclusion of all others.

However it is equally false, that having wide divisions between those who can support themselves in relative comfort with their skills and abilities and those who cannot, is a ‘just’ state. What I mean to show here is that the logic displays a veil of ignorance on behalf of the question as to the reality of our societal structures. The first premise A. for example assumes that all members of society are of the opinion that we are of equal value and we all live according to egalitarian ideals – this assumption may well be just – but it is not true. And the second premise B. assumes that society with economic divisions is not fair – this also, is patently not true in the majority of peoples’ minds. People work hard for their indulgences and lifestyles and would expect nothing less than to be rewarded for their choices, luck or risk taking as the luck egalitarians such as Ronald Dworkin, suggest.

Of course, this is not the complete picture – luck egalitarians such as Dworkin believe society should preserve our choices and champion our luck so that society may at least have some parallels when the competition to succeed heats up. The problem Dworkin thinks is that when we are governed according to our choices, and not as a result of the lottery of life and our abilities, some members of society may give us cause for regret by refusing to take part in activities that may benefit both themselves and their communities. For example, imagine a student who, failing to see any good coming of his future career working in a bank, decides to try his luck as an author and so, takes on no responsibility for his financial situation he finds himself in and expects his family and friends to support him financially while he tries to make it famous. This Dworkin knows is simply unacceptable – the young man should be making serious decisions about his future and how he may support himself, not chasing after some dear held dream – as we all make time for activities such as these. As Dworkin says of luck egalitarianism – ‘speculation, compromise and arbitrary lines,’ – soon become the lot of our attempt at making (re)distributive justice – ‘just.’

So, at this point you may think I will be making a case for the anarchist elements of society that claim no state of civilization can be considered to embrace an egalitarian ethos, as there are so many disparaging elements within peoples’ lifestyles and abilities that no society outside a state of nature can be considered fair, as each individual and all groups in society are in some way handicapped – for good or ill – by their social, intellectual and economic position. Well, I would have liked to make a case for the libertarians but found luck egalitarianism too selfish to be believed as my own example (of the young student) is somewhat handicapped by his own shortcomings, and as a result he would certainly be suffering the consequences of a desert base set for those like him in such a society. Therefore, the very best case I can make for an egalitarian society would be to support the status quo within our own society and make a case for Rawls distributive justice. Of course there is no certain argument for political obligation and as such the anarchists always win – but then don’t we have some sense of our own position in society and our own rights and responsibilities – our interests and abilities? And don’t we want to protect and preserve our rights and responsibilities should we have any – and our liberty? Isn’t this the whole point of society?

Therefore, for those who fail to make a success of their lives and remain the downtrodden, disenfranchised and destitute we must adopt the philosophy of democratic equality as was the view of Elizabeth Anderson, and reintroduce the philosophy of desertia for these unfortunate millions of people who cannot support themselves financially because in the lottery of life – as the luck egalitarians would have it, – they have fallen off the wagon..

Finally, we must first check whether the first two premises are true and that the inferences from the two premises to the conclusion are valid.

1. A.     Citizens only have obligations towards their state if that state is broadly just.  The assumption that we are only subject to the state if it treats us fairly is not true. Throughout all societies there are wide divisions in social equality and ability and should we escape the desert base that luck egalitarians champion as our island of necessita, we then enter into a social contract with the authority of state to protect our (procured) interests. What is more is that should our society lose its cohesiveness and descend into civil war, then the authority of state may well retain its consequentialist powers of martial law to remain in power – and not necessarily because we expressly consented  to democratically elect a totalitarian regime.

1. B.     States that exhibit large economic inequalities between citizens are not broadly just. In a free market economy where any individual can enter into business at their own liberty has to understand that having left the principle of desertia behind and whether through necessity or ability they succeed in acquiring greater rewards than was necessary for their comfort does not necessarily require you to share more than your own burden when it comes to becoming a patron to those causes and interests that you admire or respect; this is the libertarian view of Robert Nozick. As for the tipping point between freedom to acquire huge wealth and your rights to pursue your interests at your own liberty, the crux is how much are you willing to pay for insurance? As for those in a position of desertia, I would have thought that their freedoms are home, career and family and any relationship with money they are at liberty to involve ourselves with.

1. C.     So citizens can have no obligations to such states.’ Is this a sound argument? This statement is incontrovertible fact. The state may well have an elected house that is said to preserve and protect our interests, but should we choose to ignore the motions of parliament and we are free to leave our native soil, then we are not obliged to obey our ‘masters’. What is more, as our democratically elected house is not answerable to the electorate, then it would certainly do away with all of parliaments’ moral claims to have power over the citizens of this country, essentially, we live in a totalitarian regime. As for the House of Lords, this is much like aggrandizing the Church for its architecture and placing an unelected club of wealthy individuals in an unshakable position of power and claiming moral and intellectual superiority over those who are not quite so lucky to have been born into royal patronage.

Essentially what I hope I have made clear is that of the four schools of thought on political obligation – (parental analogy/fair play analogy/contract analogy/consequentialist analogy) – not one of them can present a sound argument and as such, we have an arbitrary state of affairs. Thus, the anarchists win because unless each individual and economic group in society gives its express consent to be governed by its chosen peers, via democracy – then the best we can hope for is a pluralist position based on libertarian values – with some social and economic desert base for those who are unable to contribute to the economic good of the economy.

To conclude my thinking I can say with certainty that the set question is not a sound argument as the social inequalities we are all so sensitive to are the result of competition within our libertarian society; and that by a matter of choice or circumstance we remain in a state of anarchy within the economic structure of our communities with a desert base in the form of the many institutions that take care of the interests of those who are unable to lead full, prosperous and productive lives. Thus, Nozick’s minimal state is the only just societal structure that has the crucial ability to allow individuals to compete within a free market economy, run on capitalist principles – for the benefit of those who take part. And to those who find this unfair, make a cottage industry of your talents!

Word Count: 1860

Bibliography:

Dworkin, R. (2011[1985]) ‘Liberalism, Resources and Equal Worth: Ronald Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Care about Equality,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp.683 – 690.

Nozick, R. (2011[1974]) ‘The Minimal State: Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp.671 -677.

Locke, J (2011[1690]) ‘Consent and Political Obligation: John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. 636 – 641.

Pike, J. ‘Political Philosophy,’ Milton Keynes: Latimer Trend and Co. Ltd. In association with The Open University.

Plato. (2011[399BC]) ‘Our Obligation to Respect the Laws of the State: Plato, Criteo,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp. 623 – 626.

Rawls, J. (2011[1972]) ‘Rational Choice and Fairness: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. pp.534 – 540.

 

 

 

Can the mind extend beyond your brain?

The question of whether the mind can extend beyond your own thoughts is an easy task to prove. The problem with the question in philosophy is that those who have thought about the subject of the mind have all concluded that the world is an illusion and our conscious waking states cannot be trusted to perceive reliable sense perception. And you may already be thinking – but many worthy philosophers have said that surely the mind is a private affair, hidden from those who may wish to intrude upon our happiness and only shared when we are sure to have a welcome audience? This solipsism of the mind being the only thing known to exist is a pathetic fallacy as we know that to observe our minds’ tripartite nature of privation is to admit that tantamount to that, our higher consciousness is at work and knows our own fissured and schizophrenic identity, with all its flaws, errors of judgement, and incomplete memories well enough to understand that we share some of ourselves with others who inhabit this same earth and they too know our minds well enough to understand the person, and all that person may well be conscious of – such as their worries, fears, phobias and those mental experiences they take pleasure in. To explore the very predicate of being in possession of a mind per say, is to explicitly admit we can know of such a faculty as a mind and its privation – but then again, we must also further admit that to take this intuitive approach allows us to realize that the world that we inhabit with all our needs and abilities to create for ourselves any of our private imaginings, then others too must also be in possession of such a thing as a mind and they too, can create for themselves anything that may be necessary for that person’s happiness, or for that matter, their survival.

To illustrate my thinking I will demonstrate a short thought experiment that should make my thinking clear. Imagine for yourself some object you use each and every day for some essential purpose; making dinner for example would require you to make use of pots and pans, a cooker or some other heat source, a wooden spoon and of course your ingredients. Now each of these objects would not have come into existence without the express volition of at least one individual to create for themselves – or another for that matter, each of the objects we have mentioned so far. Furthermore to this intuitive piece of reasoning we can also conclude that for us to be engaging in the act of making something to eat, we must also be hungry. And so, these objects that are crucial to satisfying our senses must have come into existence somehow and the reason is clear, they are necessary.

Having established that simple objects do exist and that we make use of them for crucial purposes we must already know how these objects came into being, and indeed we can clearly conclude that some person way back in ancient history needed to create for themselves objects such as those mentioned (pots, pans, spoons etc.) to accomplish a crucial task (making dinner). And so, we can reason intuitively in the privation of our mind that for such a thing as a metal pan, or a wooden spoon for that matter to exist – then someone must have conceived in their minds eye of such an object for its utility and thus, have created one.If my inking is unclear to you so far then let me try harder to explain my thinking. Imagine for yourself that you are a Israelite living in 210 BC and you have came out of Egypt without so much as a dish to eat your dinner off, let alone pots, pans and wooden spoons. Living in the Nile delta you have at your disposal vast resources of clay, wood, ferrous metals that are easy to work and you have a working knowledge of how to make any tool that may be necessary for your survival. Also, immediately around you is all the food you could possibly dream of hanging from trees and growing throughout the meadows, as well as wandering herds of cattle and sheep. Now, any young fool today knows how to take from life what’s easy to carry away, and what’s theirs. Now, imagine this, you decide you would like to camp here for the duration, alongside the delta but first you are hungry and so must fashion some sort of dish with which to cook some root vegetables and fish. It seems fairly obvious that we could fashion some sort of pot from a piece of bamboo or palm leaf and make a surface for eating off from a flat stone. Crucially – what we did here was improvise but still these objects don’t just serve a function adopted in the mind of the creator – they are as such a standing state belief and have been recalled in an appropriate situation to become an occurent belief. Thus, we can say our minds have the ability to conceive of such tools that may aid our survival or satisfaction, and that our hands may obey our minds and shape, fold and make use of the materials that may be available, to complete any task; therefore – I can conclude that indeed our mind has extended our cognition and created for any third person to see, such an object as the one the creator had in mind.

The same logical observation can also be made of making use of the broken branches around us for building a fire on which to heat our dinner, as in our mind we already know how to make a fire, though it remains a private affair not observable to a third party. However, in our desire to create some heat with which to cook our food we do indeed conceive in our minds of a fire and then set forth and actually make one from the materials at our disposal. This then can be seen as our extended mind becoming not just an occurent belief but an actual empirical event that can be observed by any conscious being. Furthermore, we can demonstrate to another person our fire building skills by telling them how to place the branches or to stuff the centre with dry grass and how to strike a flint against another to produce a spark to ignite the fire. We can also teach another simply by showing the student how things work when placed together in the right order and so, again we can conclude that from our clear and distinct idea of a fire, or pots, pans and wooden spoons for that matter, that such things exist outside of our minds by means of our own will power and skill, and that other persons with minds also have the ability to create those objects/sensations/decisions that we conceive of in our minds by use of their intuition and their dexterity of ability.

In relation to the set coursework and the thinking of Clark and Chalmers, my one and only criticism is this – through their use of deductive reasoning they both reduce the very thought that the life of the mind can be shared with others to the absurd and then fail to do justice to our light of reason when we look up from our introspection and see a real world that we inhabit alongside other humans, and what is more neither one of them will admit that they have drawn the same conclusion to the workings of their private mind – even when presented with objections and refutations they continue to rabble on about our minds are a secret affair. What Clark and Chalmers claim is that my experience of the colour yellow or the taste of chocolate or the horror of murder is exclusive to my own senses and cannot be shared with another human. This is patently false! For example the qualia objection to our minds existing outside of our cranium is false because without information getting into our minds somehow then no information could ever be learned or expressed without some explicit experience from which we had a fight or flight response. Also, without the sharing of the information in our minds we could not communicate with one another effectively or even I suspect have any language with which to communicate at all. Clark and Chalmers mistake then is to use Cartesian deduction to prove that our minds cannot perceive the same sensation, when in fact they do regularly without them being deceived whatsoever. This solipsism is always to be regarded as a pathetic fallacy as it is nothing more than sophistry! It is patently clear to all of those who do have a mind that we can and do perceive the same things with fixed regularity and are not deceived as to the fecundity of our senses, unless someone other than ourselves requires that to be the case…, unless of course the individual in question wishes to remain under the pleasant illusion that they are the only person who knows some profound experience is true. As it is false.

The only remaining problem to be encountered is to establish if any of this activity is taking place alone, then may we say that our mind has remained a private affair and that the dish I am making will be made and eaten in private. However, to any casual observer who may wish to join me to dinner they too will recognise that I am hungry and that I have decided to make myself dinner – this too is an example of how the extended mind functions.

 

Descartes Method and the Myth of the Evil Demon

Rene Descartes’ method of doubt starts by considering the verisimilitudes of his early religious education by Jesuit priests and the growing influence of the ‘new’ empirical sciences which fascinated 17^th century Europe. What Descartes was concerned about was ‘[the] multitude of opinions, each equally probable, [sic] admitted on any given subject, and [even though] the sciences borrow their principles from philosophy, they too present no firm basis of truth.’ (In Sutcliffe, F. E. (Ed) 1968, pp. 15). What Descartes wished to discover then, was how does any science make certain, without a shadow of a doubt, that you can isolate the variables and bring about conclusions that were certain to be correct?

Intuitively, Descartes suggests that the only way to find conclusive proofs of any given problem was to subject the mind to extreme scrutiny, by doubting all possible extraneous possibilities and discovering for ourselves the only true answer. Descartes then makes use of his 4 rules of investigation in these new sciences to intuit, analyse, discover or predict, respectively – the likely results of any empirical observations, which he champions as the only suitable way of using the power of the enquiring mind to discover for oneself the truth of any given problem.

These 4 rules are thus:

1. Intuition – Descartes demands that we use the ‘pure light of mind’ rather than the evidence of the senses or imagination to draw conclusions about our conscious existence. For example, Descartes intuitively knows that a triangle has 3 sides and this is indubitable.
2. Analysis – this second rule demands that we reduce the problem to its constituent parts, so that there may be no confusion as to which of its parts are certain. For example, a triangle cannot be separated from the further truth that a triangle also has 3 angles.
3.  Synthesis – here we put our previous 2 conclusions in order, starting with the simplest and by making sure the inferences between them are correct, we can deduce a third conclusion that by nature should be more complex and yet the argument throughout is sound. For example, a triangle with all its aforementioned attributes also has the substance of having angles that add up to 180 degrees.
4.  Deduction – in this last rule Descartes asks us to give deduction the nature of intuition so as to guard against any defect of memory, therefore Descartes advocates exercising our consciousness to draw the links between our first principles and there ultimate consequences. For example, a triangle could only exist in shape, breadth and extension if it has all 3 of the previous mentioned qualities, and therefore can be nothing less than a triangle.

Through these 4 cerebral apparatus, he applies his method of rigorous doubt to deduce the certainties of a given logical problem and intuitively predict the likely outcomes of all empirical observations and thus, allow us to find certainty in the sciences, particularly in philosophy. This is his method of doubt, or Cartesian scepticism, and through the use of several thought experiments he then goes on to demonstrate that we often go about gathering evidence empirically, only to discover that our observations are often flawed; and thus, again he advocates his own rigorous method of doubt as a means of finding truths within the sciences that can be considered paradigm examples of what such a method can achieve.

These thought experiments Descartes thinks, will demonstrate how the process if doubt works and what conclusions we may draw from our investigations.

The first thought experiment Descartes uses to illustrate his thinking is to consider how our senses often deceive us. Think for a moment of a chimney in the distance; now, a casual observer who by happenchance sees such a chimney at a distance may think it is made of brick or concrete, only to discover when they finally reach the foot of the tower that it is made of metal. Think again about what I may not be able to reasonably doubt, such as the fact that I am sat here in the morning writing this philosophy paper and that it is late. Now, think a third time about whether I can doubt anything profound about my life so far, such as I really am Shane Leah – as I claim to be and that this body with all its marks and contours is mine; for unless schizophrenia has warped my mind so much that my consciousness totally wide of the mark then this of course is indubitable. Thus, should I not be fully conscious right now then the only sufficient answer would be that I am in a coma and just dreaming that I still am able to take part in a life I am familiar with.

Descartes then goes on to consider that if I am to be confident in the fact that my waking life is indubitable, then why not suppose that I am asleep right now and merely dreaming I am writing this essay with Cottingham’s anthology in my lap. Well, I can only be certain of my consciousness by extension of my senses, I can touch the keyboard, I can brush my hair out of my eyes to see the screen and so on; but I know plainly that I have often been deceived of such things when I have woken from a particularly vivid dream, and so with no certain signs of the fecundity of my sense perception that I can put my trust in, I have to ask – how can I be certain of any of my conscious perceptions within my mind? Do I really exist as I think I am?

Descartes then, would have me believe that I cannot be certain of anything I sense for myself, and I can consider the present moment to be simply a concoction of many illusions that appear to me like shadow puppets projected onto a screen as a Jungian persona of the ‘animus’ – come to help me feel better about myself. We could imagine that this is the truth but then again, just the same way that fictitious novels and the paintings of Hieronomous Bosch, contain something of the real world, the visions I have at this present moment contain within them the same archetypes that sense perception allows us to experience and thus, there are some things in this dream that cannot be doubted; as Descartes himself says of this intuition, ‘at least the colours used [sic] must be real.’ (In Cottingham, J. 2011, pp. 23). And from these thoughts Descartes intuits that – ‘corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended things; the quantity or size and number of these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure and so on.’  (In Cottingham, J. 2011, pp. 23), – must equally, be true, otherwise there would be no such images or experiences that could possibly be in doubt, as there would not be any sense experience or conscious phenomena whatsoever to draw our thoughts from.

This certain and indubitable inference then leads us to consider these thoughts above in terms of reference to the truths of mathematics and geometry. Descartes’ claim that the archetypes of our dreams have their roots in our sense experience, are the antithesis to the same logic that allows our internal reasoning to remain private; as we know that working out an addition or subtraction doesn’t rely on sense experience and whether awake or asleep, 2 + 2 always make 4 and a triangle can only have 3 sides. Thus, the same is true of our sense experiences as our rational mind. Descartes is making the claim here that our conscious mind must be infallible if we care to continue our reasoning any further, but of this last assertion – Descartes knows it cannot be made, as we exist as imperfect beings who are equally capable of being deceived (ie. The chimney analogy) as we are to find intelligible certainty (ie. 2+2=4) and as such the final thought experiment seeks to resolve this problem of uncertainty in the mind and senses by making the case for the existence of an evil god, also known as the brain in a vat hypothesis.

Descartes supposes that one may find it more plausible to deny the existence of such an all – powerful god than to admit that all of our experience is merely sophistry and illusion, and rather than argue for the ontological proofs of God, Descartes strikes forward in earnest to discover what can be known for certain in spite of the powers of this deceitful demon. Descartes’ demon hypothesis therefore, brings his thoughts thus far into clear resolution by supposing that some evil demon has used all his artifice to take control of my mind and body and control those perceptions I am conscious of, to the extent where I can only be certain of being deceived on all and every count of my thinking so far. Let us suppose this demon has all the alleged attributes of an omnipotent god and yet, I cannot challenge these delusions that make up my conscious endeavours and thoughts and I do not have the power to know the real truth of the matter at hand. And so Descartes makes it his conscious intention to guard against any falsehoods that he may be conscious of to the point where he wears himself out and laments; ‘I am like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary freedom while asleep, [but] he dreads being woken up and so goes along with the pleasant illusion as long as he can.’ (In Cottingham, J. 2011, pp. 24.).

In the second of the Meditations, Descartes brings his reasoning to bear upon the first principles by using his intuition to bring forth the only truth he can find within his method of persistent doubt, this being that he cannot deny the very fact he doubts all of his premises so far, his sense experience, his thoughts, his labours on the truths of the mind and anything he can find in his consciousness that may come from some dubious source of stimulus. In essence the very nature of his persistent doubt is all he can conceive as indubitable and that as such, he exists not as a rational and sane forensic person, but as a conscious thought that doubts its own consciousness.

This conclusion is known as the cogito from the latin, cogito ergo sum – meaning ‘I think, therefore I am.’ And Descartes then goes on to intuit that through our thoughts on the extension, breadth and number etcetera, of all our sense experience or logical revisions, that all else we can experience for ourselves must also by necessity also be a real phenomenon and not some machination of some evil and omnipotent being.

My own conclusion on whether Descartes method of doubt delivers his objective of finding certainty is that his 4 rules of investigation are by far the best revision of making certain that our observations and resolutions are of merit and can benefit the mind of the enquirer by allowing the ‘pure reason of our minds’ to shine through and find the objective certainties we are looking for. However in my own experience of the intelligible nature of the mind I find that it is often flawed because we cannot capture the nature of our own consciousness without being hostage to all its fears, anxieties and worries for the future that pervade the very unintelligible phenomenon that we experience as thinking beings. And if I was to make a case for the very experience of mental illness, with all its delusions, tormented visions of horror and hallucinations I would have to say that if this mind is at all my own, then I can be certain I am not in possession of my own mind. And as such, the evil demon hypothesis has much to teach all of us, as I can doubt my own mind and its extension through breadth, depth and number as little as I can doubt that the modern world I inhabit is but a nightmare vision of biblical proportions.

an update#2

hello there those of you who have frequented my site(s). you may well have noticed i haven’t posted much recently due to the demands on my time and ability and so, i hope to continue this blog as a diary of essays on the course material i am studying. you may well think this is an unwise decision – and i can confirm that, indeed it is! BUT! i will try to maintain it as often as possible with any information i find particularly interesting or problematic and so keep you entertained. i hope!

and so, the latest essay on the finer points of the ethical debate within philosophy have been posted today. i will follow them up soon with a summary of Descartes work on epistemology and then in a month or two – i will finish my studies with a summary on the philosophy of mind and what philosophy can contribute to the ‘science’ of politics.

i hope you all hang on in there till then.

yours

shane.

Ethics in Society at Large – some guidelines…

The question of whether either Jeremy Bentham’s or J.S. Mill’s account of the tenet of hedonism is adequate, begs the further question – to what? Bentham’s own thoughts on hedonism is that we should all be pleasure seekers, never stopping to consider if our actions/decisions and revisions are of normative moral value or even if they promote the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number,’ as Mill would have had it. Bentham and Mill, when compared have very little in common with each other in terms of their values other than they both seek out a Utilitarian thesis (pleasure above all things),  as means of explaining their thoughts on morality. And so, in this essay I will attempt to demonstrate how the two philosophers’ compare when we consider what it is they mean by the principles of ‘utility’ and ‘utilitarianism’, which I hope by the end of the essay we will have separated and shown how each has its flaws and similarities; all of which hold the same principles at heart – that of the ‘pleasure principle’ or utility and that of ‘veracity’ the utilitarian ideal.

Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) was the first to establish the formal doctrine of Utilitarianism by means of his moral theory of ‘utility’ – literally ‘usefulness.’ The principle of utility according to Bentham is to promote the ‘greatest happiness’ and he recommends that the responsibility of the individual and the bodies that govern them, is to promote the felicity (happiness) of those subjugated by the institutions of the land – should they wish to adhere to them; and that those who do support the fecundity of their own desires should also champion the cause of those who stay within its boundaries. Bentham’s concerns on the topic of ethics may well be crude by the standard of today’s society but still, his account of how people should conduct their behaviour and decision making comes down to the central two themes contained within his thinking, (1) Hedonism and (2) Consequentialism. These two values make up ‘Act’ Utilitarianism;

(1). That people should seek out pleasure to the detriment of anything difficult or painful and that these pleasurable sensations should be measured quantitatively (0 -100+) in terms of the overall happiness such indulgences could possibly bless you with. The archetypes measured are: intensity, duration, the certainty of it happening, the amount of time it takes, the likelihood of repeating the process and finally to what extent will the process of enjoying same activity extend to others who may do the same?

(2). And that we should be mindful of the consequences of our decision making, should they being about unpleasurable sensations, or pain for that matter. These painful or oppressive sensations detract from the score of those above.

This basic ‘felicfic’ calculus Bentham would have us believe can measure the extent of our overall happiness over a given period of time and so quantify our experiences according to a sliding scale of joy! The only thing we should really add to Bentham’s account of hedonistic consequentialism is that in Bentham’s opinion we should make our moral judgements according to a couple of general rules of thumb, these being – does the person(s) making the moral decision have the integrity to deal with the guilt (or any other unpleasurable sensation) and how many people may benefit from the decision that is reached?

An example of Bentham’s thinking is to consider eating your favourite food as say – + 60 pluspoints, as you eat this meal regularly and you never get tired of it, it doesn’t take long to cook and what is more your friend is here to enjoy it with you. Now suppose that the same evening you break the cooker and won’t be able to have the same meal for a month, this may count for – 90 pluspoints. Thus, when you calculate the level of enjoyment gained from cooking your favourite meal for you and your friend, the sum of its inception is in fact – 30 pluspoints. Which would make it a terrible evening!

These tenets of how persons’ should go about making moral decisions was then later revised by the son of one of his contemporaries, John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873); who developed Bentham’s crude treatise by suggesting that all people should consider the quality as well as the quantity of how much joy there is to be had in any given sensation. He too measured these extremes of pleasure and pain according to a sliding scale – but for Mill, sensations were not his main concern: in fact Mill was advocating his case for the higher pleasures rather than base sensations, as one may place the ability to reason or indulge in intellectual pursuits over and above say, the experience of watching pornography. As Mill would have thought it is ‘better to be Socrates satisfied than a pig satisfied,’ and so he advocates asking intelligent people such as philosophers and other experienced people to be the judge of whether any pursuit is in fact of value, or whether it is to be avoided rather than measuring them according to some quantitative measuring rod.

A working example of how the two philosophers’ thoughts on hedonism contrast is to consider whether choosing to study philosophy for all its intrinsic value (as Mill would advocate) is going to benefit me and those who support me, or whether I should have taken this year off and gotten a well deserved rest, so I can indulge in my favourite activities – smoking, drinking and going parties! Now, Bentham in all his wisdom would always tell me to keep my interest in philosophy to a minimum – as it is so difficult, whereas Mill would be a stern advocate for the deeper understanding of the higher mind – which can be acquired by reading philosophical texts. Therefore on a sliding scale, I think that quantitatively – having a good time at a party is worth much more to me in the short term (except for the memories of any special event), than the close reading of a philosophy textbook. However, I already know that in my development as a writer I have explored the esoteric nature of my own life, and reading philosophy helps me understand the innermost nature of people like me and the motives they have and so, qualitatively – studying philosophy will help benefit my development as a writer. Thus, a parallel can be found between the two seemingly incompatible extremes of wild abandon and deep thought. This comparison should suit any person, as they’re two polarised ends of the same spectrum – though they are both compatible with enjoyment; as one clears your mind and the other gives much food for thought.

So, what criticism can we lay on the parallels and contrasts of the two doctrines? In my own analogies we have attributed the same value to Bentham’s analogy that ‘push pin is as good as poetry,’ as we do with Mill’s retort – ‘better to be Socrates satisfied than a pig satisfied.’ Here we shall attempt to demonstrate their differences.

A criticism of Bentham is that he is seemingly interested in the ‘greatest happiness’ of those who wish to pursue their own ends within a familiar world that is safe and hospitable, and neglects to give any thought to those who may be oppressed by the activities you may be at liberty to indulge in. In the age Mill lived in, which can only be seen as desperate at best – Mill’s revision of his basic precepts demanded that individuals and government, should be responsible for organising and maintaining the health and welfare of its citizens, through public bodies – such as the temperance movement (in his day) and the provision of family doctors. It is thanks to the likes of Mill that this country has an infrastructure of sewers and drains, habitable homes and public services and amenities. The foremost thing I can say about Mill though is that through his eyes we can have both pleasure and give thought to serious pursuits equally, as his account of utilitarianism is an egalitarian thesis on behalf of the utilitarian ideal of the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’ and it makes room for the quantitative values of Bentham to shine through, as Mill’s later work On Liberty, demonstrates…

…Mill does however, make a stern case for strict self – control when it comes to anything seen as hedonistic, such as smoking, drinking, sex, food or any other number of potentially harmful things. Mill is of the opinion that we should all pursue the higher faculties of the mind and body, such as deep thought, proactive sports and enjoying exercise for the benefits it offers, rather than smoking, drinking and enjoying the company of others who do the same.

Further to the points raised above we have to make clear that the extent of Mill’s thoughts on utilitarianism go much further than Bentham’s in his efforts to change the society he lived in. Mill was a stalwart of rule utilitarianism, that is – he hoped to bring about a change in society by means of his philosophical doctrine that we should all live well within the safety of the utilitarian law that states, ‘an act is right when it conforms to the rule that promotes happiness.’ For example – say you are late for a train to London and so you don’t get a ticket from the kiosk and instead jump on the train without one. Now, you know that if you are asked to show your ticket – you don’t have one, but it is entirely reasonable that you’ll be able to ask the guard to print one off for you as the train is almost empty. So no problem, unless of course there is no guard on the train, in which case – should you purchase a ticket at the end of the line, or simply walk through the exit without paying a penny? If it were a moral judgement you were to make, the majority of people wouldn’t think anything of getting away with it, after all it’s just a ticket. Mill however, is firm in his belief that this is the wrong decision to make. The railway network (was), a public infrastructure for the benefit of everyone who needs to use it should be treated with respect, and thus we should pay our fare. Therefore the rule that promotes happiness is that we should pay our fare or risk bringing the whole of the Virgin Intercity line down. This we can assume would not promote happiness for those who rely on the service daily.

However, of this last point, we can add that often Mill would make allowances for the bending or breaking of any hard and fast rules, should they promote the greatest happiness principle of his utilitarian thesis, as he thinks it ‘expedient’ that such trite rules of engagement in the social contract can often and easily be ignored – just so long as it doesn’t weigh too heavily on your conscience, or cause a catastrophe for that matter! In comparison – the same for Bentham would only result in something of an anti – climax of happiness.

To conclude, neither Bentham’s nor Mills’ account of ‘consequentialist hedonism’ are adequate to give evidence or a firm foundation to a life well lived. Measuring things by degrees or by judgement isn’t always a guarantee of happiness, no matter whether the sensation you are so fond of be a sense of ecstasy or power, or even your pride and influence as a learned professional – bear it no heed. The truth of the matter we should really be concerned with is our welfare as individuals, citizens and employees and this is what utilitarianism meant up until the early 1920’s – public works for gainful employment and town sanitation, the temperance movement and all kinds of public bodies and institutions for the betterment of the common ‘man’ – or woman for that matter – as the universal sufferage movement was just one of Mill’s many interests during his illustrious lifetime.

The final words I can offer the debate are that individuals and society at large should act according to the principle of Bentham’s utility – that we have ‘two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.’ [This] principle of utility recognise[s] this subjection and assume[s] it for the foundation of that system.’ ‘The object of which is to raise the fabric of [happiness] by means of reason and law.’ (Barber, A. 2011. Pp.183). And I would assume Mill would add to this that we should take pride in what is respectable, and promote those causes which are of deep significance and value to all who are concerned for their welfare, including free education, medical care, public services and social order, all the while maintaining our liberty – should we have any – and our freedom.

the [modern] theory of evolution and God, what’s the deal?

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Question:

‘The [modern] theory of evolution demolishes the design argument for the existence of God.’ Does it?

The theory of evolution as established by Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) in the 19^th century and reflected upon by countless generations of 20^th century thinkers may well be enough for the layman of the modern world to simply claim that the evidence for the existence of an all – powerful and omnipotent being; ie. God, is in fact a pathetic fallacy. After all, in this modern world of scientific apparatus and statistical analysis we find that all observable phenomenon are trite in there nature and obey the causal rules for our universe; ‘what goes up must come down,’ and so on. And so all the experiences that we can reasonably consider to be our own and not that of some other person (ie. A hallucination) are in fact observable and controllable – so we are told – and that when we come to studying the innermost nature of our scientific states’ of mind, we can do away with the intimacy of deep feeling and reverence towards the supernatural and all those things we do not understand because our understanding of the mind and the order of causes in the world around us is evidence enough for the natural order of things to always rest with the end result.

Philosophically, this is the thought behind the [modern] theory of evolution. It is a matter of ‘survival of the fittest.’ Hence the case for the denial of the existence of God is a strong one, but we have to ask – does this ‘theory of evolution’ do away with all rational thought on the religious perspective; that God, is The supreme creator of the universe and all life within it, and that He is all powerful and benevolent towards his finest creation. This conflict of perspective between the scientists and the theists has been much discussed during the previous two centuries and I hope to demonstrate why that philosophically – the modern theory of evolution, rather than demolishing the teleological argument, actually supports it, when we attempt to reach out for an answer to the question, ‘How did we come to be here, in this world and body; and why?’

To kick the discussion off proper we must establish the formal argument behind the [modern] theory of evolution, as established by Michael Behe and Steven Meyer. To define it clearly we must look to the nature of the world around us and see all it contains is 112 basic [known] chemical substances, just three of which are required for the formation of the basic building blocks of all life – carbon, glucose and water. Modern scientific theorists claim that these three amino acids somehow, through a process of evolution lasting millions, if not billions of years, have organised themselves into a complex and self – regulating system called DNA and RNA, which are the genome of all things that contain consciousness or may grow within the ground. Essentially any organism that has motor functions must somehow make use of respiration to provide it with the energy that it depends upon for survival and thus, we can define these living things as competing for space, food and energy (from the sun), so that we have a situation where ‘only the fittest survive.’ To intuit just for a moment what this may mean for philosophy we may have to ask a whole host of questions about the nature of our minds, life and the universe around us – a posteriori; but for us in this essay, we only have to ask : –

1. Is the [modern] theory of evolution possible?

2. By what process may this phenomenon called life have come into being?

3. Is there a force outside our control which is responsible for the act of creation we see all around us.

To define the terms for the teleological argument, we have to take Thomas Aquinas’ (1225 – 1274) thoughts on the subject and say that in our causal relationship with the world around us, for there to be an end result to the order of causes, there must be a start and any number of effects and events inbetween for any relationship between observable phenomenon to exist. And thus, something must exist above and beyond this causal relationship to have triggered the process off. Now, many would think – ‘yeah, sure – but we don’t often know what causes any object or sensation to be ‘in motion,’ it’s an unknown quantity – ‘unintelligible’ to us, as the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Temple (1941 – 1944), would have said; but – as Aquinas was a priest and a philosopher he uses the formal logic of the ontological proof* to make the claim that this agent acting outside of the order of causes is in fact conscious of its involvement, and he claims it to be God. This claim is known as Aquinas 2^nd Way.

*(this definition is that no greater being than God can be thought of, as God would be a supremely perfect being and by definition it is more perfect to exist in reality than it is to only exist within the mind. Therefore God does exist).

So, having defined the two arguments we must get to the discussion proper. How then, does the theory of evolution support rather than demolish the traditional teleological argument for the existence of God? To start with we must look to the work of Michael Behe and Steven Meyer, two philosophers who have attempted to tackle this question.

The first observation from a logical point of view (as we are studying philosophy not biology), is that no one has successfully explained how the human genome or the universe has self – regulated itself in such a manner that it can maintain its own state of equilibrium and thus survive in the most inhospitable of environments. How did this double helix of chromosomes come to develop the ability to mimic mitochondrion, self – replicate and over a period of time bring forth the mysterious experience of life, let alone take its place in an inhospitable world and compete for limited resources? Meyer’s thoughts on the subject is that the odds of DNA (re)creating itself over any vast span of time is not just improbable but preposterous.

In the set text, Timothy Chappell goes on to make Meyer’s case for him by saying, ‘[The] World of evolving creatures presupposes a prior state, out of which those creatures have evolved. This prior state is not explained by the theory of evolution; it is presupposed by it.’ (Chappell, T. 2011. Pp.92). Essentially, the exponents of the modern theory of evolution all beg the question, what was this prior state of being – if any? And is it possible that we may mutate in future?

Meyer’s argument for the modern theory of evolution claims therefore, that evolution is explained not by the impact of the environment upon life, but by the design of our DNA which has been cleverly and carefully formulated so as to give each of these organisms a distinct advantage over its competitors. And though many may be numerically identical to any other, they are qualitatively distinct and at a competitive edge. Thus, Meyer goes on to make the claim that due to the complexity and organisation of the basic building blocks to life – our very existence owes itself to some conscious entity much more complex than ourselves and infinitely more powerful, which has moulded and shaped our physiology and psychology. This, Meyer would have us believe is what we attribute to God; ie. Some unknown and unintelligible, omnipotent force for good within the universe.

But you may well ask of Meyer, ‘Doesn’t that mean that the theory of evolution is impossible?’ Surely if you are to attribute design to some Christian parody, then literally you are making the claim that we have not been designed with the potential for evolution, but in God’s image – at least metaphorically. And this train of thought leads us neatly to the thoughts of Michael Behe, who simply makes a case for there being no process of evolution, period! In his approach to this discussion of how evolution may take shape over aeons of time he uses an analogy of the structure of the eye to demonstrate that our bodily organs and the natural world around us is ‘irreducibly complex.’ Behe means by this that for evolution to occur at all, it must have occurred in stages whereby the process of developing the ability of sense perception (in the case of the eye), would have taken a lot of energy and must have left our survival at a distinct disadvantage – maybe for several generations should the species exist that much longer; as developing such an organ as an eye would have caused the species a severe handicap which would have impeded its ability to survive in this competitive and hostile environment called planet earth. Behe’s thinking then leads us to reconsider whether natural selection is at all possible and in his own words he makes the case that, ‘[A] better explanation is that such systems were deliberately designed by an intelligent being.’ (Chappell, T. 2011. Pp. 88).

Richard Dawkins evaluation on Meyer and Behe also sticks with the traditional theory from design because he also finds the probability for such a complex organism as a human being, or any other sentient thing managing to come into existence by pure chance, improbable. Dawkins starts his scientific reasoning by saying that in the case of Meyer’s theory of evolution that its ‘complexity implies statistical improbability.’ By this he means something so well organised and complex as DNA/RNA –  cannot come about by chance or circumstance. The same is true of his evaluation of Behe’s work. Our bodily organs such as our eyes must have certainly been formed perfectly in one huge quantum leap for them to be of any use whatsoever and so he claims we are NOT some freak mathematical improbability that just so happens to know that we do exist and are thus, et cogito, but rather as improbable as it sounds – our eyes were formed exactly as they appear to us today and fit for the purpose they serve. Hence Dawkins, like Behe, makes a case for there being NO irreducible complexity in the natural world. As should the former intuition that we are an impossible fraction of circumstance be at all possible we would have to consider ourselves analogous with supreme rulers of the universe! – Albeit somewhat handicapped due to our powerlessness at least makes a case for pantheism.

Supporters of the traditional teleological argument call this chaotic state of vital signs ‘the problem of evil’ and the likes of Leibniz would defend any supposed flaws of judgement on God’s part, by saying it has a purpose fitting to what many would consider an education or learning process, to prepare us we can assume for the afterlife. As a matter of fact in line with the cosmological argument Leibniz would say here that we live in ‘the best possible of all worlds,’ faults and crisis’ included, it would seem. This free will defence is complicit with the cosmological argument of Richard Swinbourne and others, who have studied the universe for many decades and gathered enough knowledge on the cosmos to introduce a ‘Goldilocks Principle.’ This anecdotal term is an answer to Meyer and Behe et al who have searched for the footprint that will provide the missing link between our scientific observations and our conscious minds. What Swinbourne establishes is that the universe has many ‘cosmological constants’ or perfect numbers that never increase or dissipate over time, the speed of light is one such cosmological constant but there are many others. And thus, he goes on to demonstrate that the conditions in our universe are perfect for life like our own to exist – as it has ‘fine tuned’ itself in such a manner as to support life. Therefore, why should this universe be so fertile as to create this mysterious phenomenon called life that we take so much for granted? Well, the truth be told we have no idea, but once again the mystery of our faculties and the vast expanse of space bear a striking parallel to our own innermost natures’ – that of a creator/destroyer and all else that we may conceive of someday becoming.

To conclude the discussion I will reiterate my opening thoughts and say that NO, the modern theory of evolution does not do away with the design argument – as a matter of fact it supports it. And even though the design argument is flawed by the ‘problem of evil,’ there have been many people with a religious inclination find solace and faith in the uncertainty of their belief, and overcome the problem of evil to be reborn. Now faith may be a subjective and uncertain way of making sense of your life when all seems lost and may not appeal to every member of the human race, but this does not mean the evidence for God being absent. The world around us and our own lives are proof enough for me and others’ that the universes’ creation was divinely inspired, and we are the product and the proof of some divine creator whom takes delight in us learning as a child would.

Words: 2208

Bibliography:

Aquinas, T. (2011[1266-73]) ‘The Five Proofs of God: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 348 -351.

Anselm, St. (2011[1077-78]) ‘The existence of God: Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 345 – 347.

Chappell, T. (2011) ‘The Philosophy of Religion,’ Milton Keynes: The Open University.

Hume, D. (2011[1777]) ‘The Argument from Design: David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 365 – 370.

Kierkegaard, S. (2011[1846]) ‘Faith and Subjectivity: Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 376 – 382.

Leibniz, G. (2011[1710]) ‘The Problem of Evil: Gottfried Leibniz, Theodicy,’ in Cottingham, J. (Ed) (2011) ‘Western Philosophy: An Anthology, Second Edition,’ Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Pp. 359 – 364.

philosophy of religion

hello again! to kick this new year off proper i plan to post my own essay on the philosophy of religion soon, with a few footnotes to add some dynamism and embellishments to the case i have made for the existance of an all powerful God (though not necessarily a Christian one), as opposed to the modern theory of evolution. i would have liked to make more of this particular part of the course on this blog, but my time and ability are limited so, i guess i will have to do things by degrees ~ or fractions for that matter! i hope you will enjoy my thoughts on religion as i have been closely reading my Bible for a great many years now and even though i cannot really give my heart and soul to it, i can understand by analogy what the message contained therein is all about. i hope you find my thoughts as fascinating as i have found the wonder of the world around us, even if i am just taking in the horror of it all!

Derek Parfit and Survival.

hello again! i am sorry if you have been waiting for this update but i have been busy trying to get to grips with the philosophy of religion texts, which have taken up all of my time. but now, onwards! – to complete our look at the philosophy of the self, we now have to cover Derek Parfit’s non – reductionist approach to the problem of ‘what makes me an indivisible and numerically distinct person, and above all else – what does this mean for our notion of self?’

in his 1984 publication – ‘Reasons and Persons,’ parfit makes just two points in his opening thesis. these are: –

1. questions about personal identity aren’t really necessary and instead we should focus our attention on the survival of our psychological continuity and corporeal awareness.

2. in the thought experiments Locke and Hume used to illustrate their thinking, there really isn’t a right or wrong answer to the question of whether any given person has an unchanging and indivisible continuity of identity, over any given period of time.

~ thus Parfit’s answer to the question of personal identity is that SURVIVAL is the key to our understanding of our own innermost natures’ – both legally and morally, maybe even spiritually!

Parfit’s first thought experiment is that of a Brain Transplant. imagine if you would that when i had my breakdown 11 years ago, my Doctor severed my brain in half via the corpus callosum and transplanted the two halves into 2 different bodies; and when both these Frankensteins are woken from their analgesic coma they both have total recall fo being me – Shane Leah. now from the perspective of a third person, which if any of these two qualitatively distinct persons is the real me?

there are 3 possible answers:

1. i will be both.

2. i will be just 1 of the 2 people.

3. i will be neither of the 2 resulting people.

~ Parfit’s best answer is that the experiment is inconclusive because identity requires an indivisible ‘one on one’ relationship with the self. therefore, the only case we can make for this particular experiment is that i would have full psychological continuity but no identity = SURVIVAL WITHOUT IDENTITY.

the formal argument for Parfit’s rejection of the original premise is as follows.

1. one person (myself) cannot be two distinct people leading different lives = CONTRADICTION ~ 2 identities, 1 person. (so there are 2 entities with the same numerical identity).

2. choosing one person (me) over his identical twin (myself) is an arbitrary task, as they have the same relation and could not be considered the self-same man = WILDLY IMPLAUSIBLE ~ 1 identity, 2 persons. (so there is 1 non – entity and only 1 self but 2 corporeal bodies)

3. the idea i cannot be either of the two resulting people is grossly misleading as i would cease to exist and therefore the only conclusion i could draw is = DEATH ~ no persons’ and 2 non entities. (so there is no self (ie. me)  to be found, just two distinct bodies).

~ therefore, Parfit in his thought experiment shows we can have full psychological continuity but no personal identity and so, all that remains is SURVIVAL WITHOUT IDENTITY. hence there can be no right answer to the puzzle as the crucial matter is not whether our identity remains after the transplant but whether we SURVIVE.

the second of Parfit’s thought experiments  is his Resurrection Thesis. in this experiment Parfit asks us to imagine that you (or i for that matter), have died and a mad scientist resurrects you/me perfectly in a new organic body and transfers all your worldly experiences and ideas into it. on being woken from you analgesic coma, you have total recall of your previous life and are psychologically continuous in every way. now we have to ask, is this Frankenstein really me? yes or no?

here Godfrey Vesey – one of Parfit’s contemporaries answers succinctly that only one of two answers can be correct.

1. we could only consider this resurrected person me, if we can grasp hold of the idea of a soul and thus prove cartesian dualism is the only correct way of identifying any given person as a numerically distinct person, never to be compared or replaced with something akin to itself.

2. if the nature of the corporeal body is crucial to the continuity of identity then surely the death of the body starts a process of decay that results in ceasing to exist? and so the resurrected me is not truly me at all.

to illustrate his thinking further Parfit then brings in one more thought experiment known as The Club.

~ Parfit asks us to imagine a club that has met up for 30 years and then one day disbands. now 2 former members of the club resurrect the club in another country 20 years later. now is this club the same club, or is it a totally new one? Parfit intuits that the question is absurd because there is no difference whatsoever. and so, how can we defend the case for personal identity if in the test case there is no difference? its an ALL OR NOTHING situation, and akin to the case of the resurrected person, the question begged of the experiment is, ‘is this Frankenstein me or just someone like me?’

Parfit concludes his thinking by suggesting that the only thing that could possibly join personal identity and psychological continuity together is the possession of a SOUL, and harking back to Locke, Hume and Reid et al – the only plausible answer to the question begged ~ in what exactly is our personal identity contained ~ is that the traditional cartesian dualism as established by Rene Descartes, should suffice to say it all. this being that PERSONAL IDENTITY = PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY and that for either of these two essential qualities of Man to survive death, there must be a SOUL.

a brief update

just in case you are following this blog with any regularity, i just want to let you know that i am preparing a short story of my own ideas on personal identity based on the work of Derek Parfit and his ‘Teletransporter‘ thought experiment that shows the essence of personal identity is contained within our sense of living or dying, after a change in our corporeal circumstances.

Parfit’s non – reductionist approach will help me explain my own thoughts on the changes i have encounterted as i grew older and allow me to answer the question; am i – Shane Leah, the same person today, as i was say – 11 years ago when i was diagnosed with a mental illness? and what’s more, will i still be the person i am today – in another 11 years time?

so, while you digest what i have written already (and i hope at least some of it is an accurate portrayal of what each of the names’ mentioned, meant to demonstrate by their thinking), i will get to it and draw my conclusions on my thoughts on personal identity!